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This thesis focuses on the modeling of F-14A component failure rates. Current
methodology employs the Exponential distribution to model component failures and
the associated Poisson distribution to determine expected demand. Three other failure
rate distributions are explored as alternatives: a WeibuU Qight hour model, a Geometric
sortie-dependent model, and a Mixed sortie-Oight hour model. The expected number of
component failures is calculated for each model and a comparison is made between the
current model and these alternatives. The specific results pertain to aircraft of this type
but the concepts employed can be applied to other aircraft as well.
The Geometric model provided a better fit for components which were not
operated continuously, and the WeibuU performed better when the components were
operated continuously. Overall, the Exponential was the least elTective model for the
nine components studied.
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While ever\' efTort has been made,
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and
logic errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs
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1. A Carrier Naxy
The carrier is the nucleus of today's U.S. Navy, but its ability to project power
is a byproduct of the synergistic relationship it shares with its air wing. As Peter
Garrison stated in CV: Carrier Aviation, "by adopting submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and ship-based tactical aircraft the navy has co-opted some of the tools of the
army and air force and adapted them to a marine environment. Ships in themselves are
no longer powerful, they take their power from the airplanes or long range missiles that
they carr\'. An adversary' setting out to sink a ship does not send another ship against
it, but instead sends an airplane or a missile" [Ref 1]. (italics mine). The fleet has
become dependent upon aircraft to take the battle over the horizon, and to extend the
battle group's area of influence. Without downplaying the importance of the carrier, it
is just another large ship without its contingent of aircraft. Thus, the carrier's real
importance to the fleet rests on the abiUty of its personnel to support and maintain the
air wing at an optimal level of readiness.
2. Aircraft Readiness
Ideally, the fleet would like each aircraft to be fully mission capable (FMC);
that is, the material condition of the aircraft should satisfy minimum requirements to
perform all of its missions. An aircraft's mission status (e.g.. partially mission capable
(PMC), not mission capable (NMC). etc.) is determined using the Mission Essential
Subsystems Matrices published in OPNAVINST 5442.4H.
The ability to ensure a high percentage of FMC aircraft is constrained by
several factors. First, the Xa\7 has not been able to. provide shipboard intermediate
maintenance activities (IMA) with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, especially
in critical technical billets. In part, this results from the allocation of manpower based
on squadron size (i.e.. the smaller squadrons have fewer personnel to maintain their
aircraft). The problem associated with the manpower shortage is compounded by a
need for specialization in troubleshooting and repairing the different aircraft types,
models, and series deployed on the carrier. Second, the IMA's capability to repair
components as they fail is constrained by limitations of test equipment, maintenance
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facility size, availability of repair parts, and the total demand within the repair pipeline.
Finally, those components which cannot be fixed at the intermediate level must be
resupplied by outside sources.
The air wing must be able to accurately identify and communicate its
requirements for component replacements and resupply facilities should be capable of
expeditiously responding to the those needs. During periods of high tempo flight
operations, as would be experienced during wartime, the factors listed above become
more critical. The ability to maintain high levels of readiness is hampered by an
increase in the number of components in the repair pipeline, manpower and facility
limitations, and a reduced or nonexistent abiUty to resupply vital components.
Potential problems may be partially rectified by improving the methodologies currently
used to attain that "best" possible mix of replacement parts located on the aircraft
carrier. [Ref. 2: pp. 3.9]
B. AVIATION CONSOLIDATED ALLOWANCES
1. Definition
The Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) is supposed to be a
"best" mix invehtor\'. An AVCAL is defined in OPNAVINST 4790.2C as a list of
aeronautical material tailored to each individual ship to support assigned or embarked
aircraft flight operations. This list of parts is prepared by the Navy's Aviation Supply
Ofiice (ASO) under the direction of the aircraft type commander, and determines spare
part allowances based on expected demands.
Ideally, it would be advantageous to stock, at least one spare for each part
that could possibly fail during deployment regardless of how unlikely that occurrence
might be. Unfortunately, inventory sizes are constrained by both budget
considerations and storage limitations. The latter is the result of a diverse collection of
aircraft types, manufactured by different companies with each aircraft requiring its own
specific replacement parts, coupled with the inherent aversion to building aircraft
carriers even larger than they already are simply to carry more parts. Table 1 lists the
normal complement of aircraft aboard a carrier, and is provided to illustrate the
differences in aircraft types, missions, and spare part requirements. [Ref 2: p. 5].
2. Need for Improvement
Determination of the proper AVCAL allowance for each component is not an
easy task, and is definitely an area needing improvement. A recent study conducted by
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TABLE 1
NORMAL COMPLEMENT OF CARRIER AIRCRAFT
AIRCR.AFT MISSION SQUADRONS AIRCR.'XFT
F-14A Fighter 2 24








the Center for Naval Analyses reported that "statistics for combat aircraft operating
during the period July 1982 through June 1983 show aircraft operating at less than 60
percent of their anticipated wartime rate. These aircraft were not FVIC due to supply
between 18-24 percent of the time. These readiness rates would drop significantly if the
aircraft flew at a wartime rate and AVCALs continued to be constructed as they were
in this period" [Ref. 3: p. 1-1]. This statement strengthens the argument that current
methods of AVCAL formulation are, at best, adequate for peacetime operations, but
could result in disastrously low readiness rates when exposed to the additional
requirements associated with wartime utilization. Two approaches to detennining a
better AVCAL would be the introduction of new methods of modelling requirements or
the improvement of weak areas within the current model.
3. AVCAL Models
Two categories oC models used to compute the AVCAL are readiness-based
and demand-based inventor>' systems. Readiness-based systems determine spare
allowances that achieve a predetermined level of readiness while minimizing the cost of
the AVCAL. Examples of readiness-based models are Rand's DYNAMETRIC model
and the Center for Naval Analyses' Ml VIE model [Ref 3: p. 2-8]. Demand-based
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(supply effectiveness) models determine component allowances based on expected
demand and the capabilities of the repair facility and resupply pipeline. The ASO
Manual model is an example of a demand-based method, and is the model currently
used by the Navy to compute AVCAL spare allowances.
C. ASO MANUAL MODEL
The ASO Manual Model uses historic data to forecast demand rates and
component repair times. The model determines the type and number of components
included in the AVCAL allowance. For a detailed explanation of the rules governing
component selection, the reader should refer to either Aviation Parts Allowance Policy
by Peter Evanovich or A Retail Inventory Model for lYaval Aviation Repairable Items by
Mark L. Mitchell. [Refs. 3,4].
1. Attrition Only Items
Attrition only items are repairable components that cannot be repaired at the
intermediate maintenance activity aboard the carrier. The expected demand for items
of this type is computed using equation I.l.
NB' = NBx(FH'/FH) (eqn 1.1)
where,
NB' = number of expected attritions for a specific flight program
NB =' number of attritions in the ASO data base
FH' = specified flight program
FH = total flight hours represented by the ASO data base
2. Items that can be Repaired Locally
The allowance for items that can be repaired locally is composed of two parts.
An allowance for repairable components that are beyond the capabilities of the local
maintenance activity to repair them (BCM), and an allowance for components that are
queued at various places in the local repair cycle.
a. BCM Allowance
Units are considered BCM if the maintenance activity cannot repair the
item because of a lack of tools, equipment, parts or technical expertise. Equation 1.1 is
used to forecast the number of BCM failures expected to occur tor a specific flight
program.
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b. Repair Pipeline Allowance
The second input to the local repairable allowance provides units to
compensate for the number of failed components undergoing repair at the IMA. This
allowance, called the Local Repair Cycle Allowance (LRCA), is set at a quantity which
should ensure that demand does not exceed available supply at least ninety percent of
the time. This safety level is dependent upon an accurate estimate of the number of
components repaired by the shipboard intermediate maintenance activity. Such a
forecast is expressed in equation 1.2.
NR' = NRx{FH7FH) (eqn 1.2)
where,
NR' = number of expected repairs for a specific flight program
NR = number of repairs represented in the ASO data base
and,
.
FH' and FH remain as defined above
D. FAILURE RATE DISTRIBUTION
Combining equations 1.1 and 1.2 provides the expected number of total failures,
both repairables and attritables, for the specified flight program.^
..
'. NR' + NB' = (NR + NB)x(FH';FH) (eqn 1.4)
Substituting NF' for NR' + NB' and NF for NR + NB. equation 1.4 can be expressed
as:
NF' = NFX(FH'/FH) (eqn 1.5)
Equation 1.6 results from rearranging terms on the right hand side of equation 1.5.
NF' = (NF;FH)xFH' (eqn 1.6)
^For "attrition only items" NR' equals zero.
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The total number of expected failures NF' equals the product of some specific
future flight program (FH') and the quantity NF/FH. The latter should be easily
recognized as the maximum likelihood estimate (based on the historical data base) for
the failure rate lambda. Thus, NF' is the expected value of a Poisson distribution with
the failure rate parameter X and interval of observation {0,FH']. The use of the Poisson
distribution implies that the underlying distribution for the time between failures is
exponential. Certain properties of the exponential distribution simplify the
computational problem, but what price is paid for this simplicity? The remainder of
this paper will suggest alternative distributions for describing the time between
component failures and estimating the expected number of failures for a given flight
program.
E. SYNOPSIS
Chapter II describes the methods and assumptions used to extract component
failure information from a data base containing six squadrons of F-14A aircraft flight
and maintenance records. Chapters 111 and IV discuss current and possible methods
of modeling aircraft failure rates, and techniques used to derive maximum likelihood
estimates of model parameters. Flight hour dependent models are presented in Chapter
III and include the traditional Exponential model and a WeibuU model. Chapter IV
discusses a sortie-dependent Geometric model, and the sortie-flight hour Mixed model
proposed in Distinguishing the Effects on Failures of Changes in Sortie Rate and Sortie
. Leng'th by Robert A. Levy [Ref 5]. The four different models will be compared in
Chapter V using both graphical and quantitative measures of fit. Finally, Chapter VI




A. ORIGIN OF DATA
The initial data base was obtained from the 'Savy Maintenance Support Office
(NMSO), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania via the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria,
Virginia. The data set included the historical flight and maintenance records for two
operational deployments of F-14A aircraft. The most recent deployment included two
squadrons, VF-1I4 and VF-213, which operated ofTthe USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65)
during the period of March 1984 through December 1984. This deployment became the
"model" set, with its flight and maintenance records providing the parameter estimates,
for the study.
The second, earlier deployment consisted of four squadrons, VF-11 VF-31 and
VF-14 VF-32, which operated olT the USS KENNEDY {CV-67) and USS
INDEPENDENCE (CV-62), respectively, during the period of November 1983 through
March 1984. In this study these four squadrons were treated as the "validation" set.
Using the parameter estmiates from the model set, four specific failure rate
distributions were used to calculate the expected number of component failures which
should occur during a deployment similar to the one flown by the four squadrons
aboard the USS KENNEDY and USS INDEPENDENCE. The actual number of
component failures observed during the deployment of these squadrons was then
compared with the expected number generated using the parameters estimated from the
"model" set deployment.
B. MAINTENANCE DATA SYSTEM (MDS)
1. Purpose
The maintenance data system (MDS) was developed to improve the
management capabilities of the Navv-'s Vlaintenance and Material Management (3-M)
system. It was designed as a management information system which would provide the
statistical data needed to analyze:
• Equipment maintainability and reliability
• Equipment configuration to include alterations and technical directive
compliance
• Equipment mission capability and utilization rates
• Material usaee
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• Maintenance and material procurement times
• Weapon system and material costing
To meet the data requirements listed above, NMSO divides the data collection
efibrt into four specific areas: material reporting (MR), subsystem capability impact
reporting (SCIR), maintenance data reporting (MDR), and utilization reporting. The
material reporting system documents those materials used in support of the
maintenance efTorts. The subsystem capability impact report provides the higher level
commanders with information pertaining to their subordinate command's ability to
conduct their mission. The last two areas of data collection, maintenance data
reporting and utilization reporting, provided the data necessary to determine the times
between component failures.
2. Maintenance Data Reporting (MDR)
The documents which support the maintenance data reporting system include
support action forms (SAF), metrology equipment recall (VIETER) cards, and the
Visual Information Display System/Maintenance Action Forms (VIDS/MAF). Support
action forms document maintenance actions that did not require any corrective action.
such as, aircraft servicing, aircraft handling, gind the preliminary look phase of an
inspection. VIETER cards identify the maintenance time spent calibrating, and repairing
the test and measuring systems. The last form. VIDS/VIAF (OPNAV 4790/60),
documents inspections, technical directive compliance, and repair actions. It identifies
the component failures by work, unit code, time of failure (Julian date and. when
discovered code), aircraft experiencing the failure (bureau number), cause of failure
(malfunction description code), and type of maintenance required (transaction code and
action taken code).
3. Utilization Reporting
The flight records (utilization rates) were compiled from information recorded
on the Aircraft Yellow Sheet (OPNAV 3760/2B). The Yellow Sheet is prepared by air
crew personnel at the end of each mission and contains information identifying the
flight according to aircraft flown, mission type, Julian date, flight duration, etc.
C. SELECTED WORK UNIT CODES
A work unit code (WUC) is an alphanumeric code identifying an item on which
work is being performed. Systems are identified with two digit codes and components
with Ave digit codes. Seven digit codes are used to further breakdown components into
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lower levels of subassembly. The components selected for this study are listed in
Table 2. Each of the nine components chosen had at least thirty failures during the
deployment cycle.
TABLE 2
COMPONENTS WITH ASSOCIATED WORK UNIT CODES
COMPONENT WUC
CN1263;ASN92(V) INERTIAL MEASURING UNIT 734H100
ECU74/A SIGNAL DATA CONVERTER 46X1600
MXU611/A FUEL TANK RELEASE MECHANISM 4622100
CP1166;A AIR DATA COMPUTER 56X2500
AN/ARC159/159(V)-1 UHF TR.-\NSMltTER 632Z100
T1224/AWG9 R.-XDAR TR.ANSMITTER 74A1500
IP1185/AWG9 DETAIL DATA DISPLAY 74A5M00
CP124S/ASW43 AIRCR.-XFT ROLL COMPUTER 5772200
IP1027/AVA12 ANALOG DISPLAY INDICATOR 6918100
D. DATA REDUCTION
The intent of the data reduction process is to eliminate those maintenance
actions which do not identify a component failure (e.g., aircraft servicing,
troubleshooting, calibrations, or other routine maintenance actions). The maintenance
codes not indicative of a component/item failure are found within the series of
malfunction description, transaction, and action taken codes. [Ref 6: pp. 17-19]
1. Malfunction Description Codes
The three digit numeric malfunction description codes describe, as accurately
as possible, the probable cause of a system; component failure. Vlaifunction
description codes used when no failure was detected are displayed in Table 3.
Maintenance records which contained these codes were eliminated from the final data
set. Conditional malfunction description codes identify component failures caused by
factors other than natural wear-out. Examples of this type of failure include: failed due
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to weather, foreign object damage (FOD), improper or faulty maimenance, etc. To
reduce the complexity of parameter estimation, conditional failures were treated as if
the failure had occurred through normal usage. The components studied had a low
percentage of conditional failures. In fact, less than three percent of all observed
failures were conditional.
TABLE 3
EXCLUDED MALFUNCTION DESCRIPTION CODES
CODE DESCRIPTION
799 . No defect
800 No defect - removed and/or reinstalled to facilitate' maintenance
801 No defect - removed for modification -
803 No defect - removed for time chanse
804 No defect - removed for sclieduled "maintenance
805 No defect - removed for pool stock
806 No defect - removed as part of a matched system
807 No defect - removal directed bv hiaher authority
811 No defect - removed during troubleshooting
2. Transaction Codes
Transaction codes are two digit numeric codes used to identify the type of
data reported by the maintenance activity. Transaction codes used in the maintenance
reporting system are listed in Appendix A. Table 4 lists those transaction codes
indicative of maintenance actions that required removal, installation, and/or repair of a
defective component. Maintenance records associated with these codes were included in
the final data set. All other maintenance records were deleted.
3. Action Taken Codes
Action taken codes are one digit alphanumeric codes which describe the
maintenance action performed on the system, component or item. A complete list of
action taken codes is shown in Appendix B. Action taken codes associated with the
removal, installation, and/ or repair of a defective component were included in the final
data set and are shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 4
TRANSACTION CODES USED IN STUDY
CODE DESCRIPTION
12 On-equipment work, includine engines, involving non-
repairable components/items documented as failed parts.
21 Will be used when a repairable component is removed,
excluding engine components, for processing at an I or D
level mamtenance activity (This code is used when
only the removal must be documented and a replacement
is not required).
23 Removal and replacement of a defective or suspected
defective component from an end item, excluding engines
at the O-level. Additionallv this code is used for^the^
removal and replacement of a complete engine assembly
for a defect, suspected defect, or scneduled^maintenance
requirement.
24 Will be used when a repairable engine component
is removed for orocessing at an I or D level activity
(This code is used when onlv the removal must be'
documented and a replacement is not required).
25 Removal and replacement of a defective or suspected
defective repairaole component from an 'engine.
E. FINAL DATA SET
1. Problems
Several problems were encountered during the data reduction process that
require discussion. First, it was not always clear which flight evolution caused a
component to fail. The cause for this confusion is the poor record keeping associated
with the actual time of component failures. For example, the maintenance data
reporting system does not record the actual time of component failure. Instead, the
data is arranged according to the time the maintenance activity received the component
for repair. In most, but not all cases, the component was received by the maintenance
activity immediately following the flight causing the component failure.
Second, several records indicated multiple failures of a single component. For
example, a single component may experience several unrelated malfunctions during a
single flight evolution. To expedite the repair and, or replacement of the failed





1 BCM - maintenance activity not authorized to conduct
repair
2 BCM - Lack of equipment, tools, or facilities
3 BCM - Lack of technical skills necessary to complete
repair
4 BCM - Lack of parts
5 BCVI - Fails check and test, and maintenance is allowed
to conduct check and test only
6 BCVI - Lack of technical data
7 BCM - Beyond the authorized repair depth
8 BCM - Administrative
9 BCM - Condemned, repair not feasible
C This code is used when a repairable iiem of material
identified by a work unit code is repaired.
F Failure of components/items undergoing test.
P This code is entered when an item of material is
removed and only the removal is to be accounted for.
Q This code is entered when an item is installed and
only the installation action is to be accounted lor.
R This code is entered when an item of material is
removed due to suspected malfunction and the same or a
like item is reinstalled.
* BCM: Action taken codes labelled 1-9 are used for repairable
items which have been adniinistrativelv and; or technicallv screened
and lound to be beyond the capability ol the maintenance activity.
malfunction (i.e.. multiple failures of a single component). Previous studies have
treated this problem as independent single component failures with identical
interoccurrence times. The alternative is to treat the multiple failure as a single
incident.
Third, the underlying assumption of the exponential distribution is that
components fail as a function of flight hours flown. This would imply that a
component is operated continuously, which may or may not be the case.
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Fourth, it was difficult to determine if a component was replaced immediately
following the flight evolution causing the failure. Additionally, there was some concern
pertaining to periods of flight operations during which a component might be missing.
Fifth, the condition of the component (i.e., new or used) at the start of
deployment was not always known. A related problem involves the use of the same
failure rate distribution for both repaired and new components.
2. Simplifying Assumptions
Before proceeding with any data analysis, it is necessary to make assumptions
which can simplify or eliminate the problems discussed in the previous section. These
assumptions are presented in the same order as the problem areas they are intended to
simplify.
First, all failures are associated with the sortie during which they occurred for
When Discovered Codes A, B. C. and D. For all other codes, it is assumed that the
training and experience of the flight and ground crews ensure the discover\' of the
failure at the earliest- possible opportunity (i.e., the failure occurred during the flight
prior to discover^'). A complete listing of When Discovered Codes is found in
Appendix C.
Second, all multiple failures of a single component are treated as a single
component failure. It is believed that multiple failures would affect the turnaround
time required to repair the component and may cause delays within the repair pipeline.
However, this should not affect the rate at which the component fails.
Third, it is assumed that components operate continuously, at least in a
standby mode. If this is not the case, the sortie-dependent models should provide a
better estimate of expected failures.
Fourth, the study assumes that components are replaced inunediately and that
gaps in coverage are not allowed. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that an aircraft
would operate without any of the components listed in this thesis.
Fifth, all components are considered new at the start of the deployment. For
the Exponential and Geometric models this assumption is not necessan.' due to the
"memor\'less property" they exhibit. Additionally, the impact on the WeibuU
distribution should be minimal if the number of observed failures is large.
Finally, to reduce the complexity of the problem, it is necessar\' to assume
that repaired components exhibit the same failure characteristics as new components




To obtain the best possible estimate of the time between failures, the
observations within the initial data base were sorted by aircraft bureau number, then
Julian date and the event time. Failure times were measured between consecutive
component failures on a specific aircraft. These measurements were never made
between component failures on two different aircraft. The information included in the
final data set is the aggregate totals and includes a censoring indicator, number of
sorties flown, flight time without failure, and flight time with failure.
A censor indicator equal to zero indicates that a component failure was
observed. The data entries associated with this type of observation include the number
of flights flown inclusive of the event causing the failure, total flight time flown since
last failure (does not include flight time of event causing failure), and the flight time of
the event causing the failure.
A censor indicator equal to one represents an event which is right hand
censored. Right hand censoring refers to an observation of a component which does
not fail prior to the termination of the deployment (i.e., the data set documents a
components survival time, but provides no information pertaining to the actual time of
component failure). The data entries associated with this type of observation are the
total number of flights flown and the total flight time since the last component failure.
b. Model Comparison
The intent of this thesis is to determine each model's ability to predict
failures for the components listed, and compare those predictions with the actual
component failures observed during the deployment of the squadrons aboard the
USS KENNEDY and L'SS INDEPENDENCE. To accurately assess these capabilities,
it was necessary' to identify component failures as they occurred during the deployment.
Thus, the data set used to provide the graphical and quantitative comparison of the
predicted vs actual component failures was different than the data set used to estimate
the model parameters. The latter data set was sorted by Julian date and event time
only. The accumulated number of sorties flown and flight hour totals were recorded
with the observation of each failure, such that, comparisons could be made with the
expected failures generated by the failure rate models.
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4. Summary Statistics
Table 6 summarizes the two data sets and provides such information as the
number of aircraft assigned, sorties flown, flight hour totals, component failures, etc.
TABLE 6
SUMMARY STATISTICS
DATA SET AIRCRAFT SORTIES
FLT HRS SORTIE
FLT HRS MEAN STD.DEV.
MODEL 30 3489- 7608.8 2.18 .98















MODEL SET = VF-I14and VF-213
VALIDATION SET = VF-11, VF-14, VF-31,and VF-32
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III. FLIGHT HOUR MODELS
A. OVERVIEW
The two models discussed in this chapter describe component failures as a
function of flight hours only. The first fiight hour model to be examined is the
exponential, which is the model currently used by the Navy to describe the distribution
of the time between component failures. This model has some weaknesses inherited
from the properties of the exponential distributio.n. The effect these problem areas
might have on the model's ability to accurately predict component failures will be
discussed in the next section. The three models offered as alternatives should provide
improvement to some or all of these problem areas, and the comparisons made in
Chapter V should shed new light on the magnitude of these deficiencies.
The second fiight hour model discussed is the WeibuU. It is offered as an
alternative method of describing the time between failures when fiight hours are the
only factors contributing to the component malfunction.
B. EXPONENTIAL MODEL
1. Weaknesses
There are two major weaknesses associated with this model that cause some
concern. First, the exponential is a fiight hour model and as such it is insensitive to the
effects of the sortie on the component's time of failure. In Chapter V it will be shown
that the expected number of component failures for the time interval (O.t] is
proportional to t, so that the expected number of failures for a specific fiight hour total
is not affected by the average sortie length (i.e., the number of sorties fiown).
Second, the exponential distributions are "NO WEAR" distributions, which
indicates that a component's probability of surviving a fiight of duration t is the same
for new components as it is for components which are "S" hours old {i.e.. the
conditional survival probability is equal to the unconditional probability of survival).
This is the "memor\'less" property of the exponential distribution, and implies that the
prior use of a component has no effect on the time of its failure.
The same concern is refiected in the exponential distribution's constant hazard
rate r(t) (i.e.. r(t}=}v for all values of t). As such, the failure rate X would not be
affected by the time on test t. It is believed that certain components exhibit hazard
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rates that are decreasing functions of time (t). In fact, many pieces of electronic
equipment are routinely exposed to burn-in periods to make the component less
susceptible to failure when put into operation. Conversely, it can be argued that other
components have hazard rates that increase with time (i.e., a component is more likely
to fail as it experiences some wear and tear). The exponential distribution is not
capable of modelling these diflerences.
2. Ma.ximum Likelihood Results
The maximum likelihood estimate, X', of the exponential failure rate
parameter "k (failures/ hour) is found by iteratively solving equation 3.1r
^ _ t.exp(-Xt.) T:,t:>0, X>0, m<n
• yT. = V_L_J2^ \L. I'J
'
(eqn3.1)
Y • Y ^-^^P^-^V i=U2,...,n j=l,2 m
where, the left hand side of equation 3.1 equals the aggregate flight time for those
sorties that did not experience a specific component failure, t: is the duration of the
sortie causing the failure, n is the total number of records, censored and uncensored,
within the final data set,- and m is the number of uncensored observations (failures).
If the sortie lengths, t:. are equal to t for all j, then equation 3.1 can be
simplified to the closed form expression given in equation 3.2. Thus, the average sortie




where, FTWF (Flight Time Without Failure) equals the sum of the T-'s for i= l,...n,
TFT equals the total flight time for the deployment, and t equals the average sortie
length.
The maximum likelihood estimate for X' was found using the FORTR.A.X
program listed in Appendix E. The parameter estimates and 95 percent confidence
limits for these estimates are displayed in Table 7.




EXPONENTIAL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS
WUC X' di' CL^
734H100 .0140 .0018 (.0106,.0175)
46X1600 .0048 .0010 {.0029,.0067)
4622100 .0065 .0011 (.0043,.0086)
56X2500 .0114 .0021 (.0073,.0155)
632Z100 .0067 .0012 (.0043,.0090)
74A1500 .0143 .0019 (.0105,.0181)
74A5M00 .0159 .0024 (.0113,.0206)
5772200 .0048 .0011 (.0026,.0070)
6918100 .0108 • .0015 (.0079,.0137)
**"* CL= 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LIMITS
3. Quantile-Quantile Plots
A graphical method often used to determine an empirical data's goodness of
fit with respect to a theoretical distribution is the quantile-quantile plot. The technique
requires the observations, X^,X2,...,X^, to be ordered from smallest to largest.
Empirical quantiles are then computed for these order statistics based on a formula,
such as Qj = (i-.5);n, where Q. is the empirical quantile for the X/|^ order statistic and n
equals the total number of observations. These empirical quantiles are plotted against
the theoretical quantiles to produce a graphical estimate of goodness of fit.
Some adjustments to the above technique must be made to overcome the
problems of censoring. The first adjustment relates to the problem associated with
incomplete knowledge of the actual time of component failure. In Chapter II, it was
mentioned that the failure occurred during the interval T. to T. + t.. To simplify this
problem, it is assumed that the midpoint of that interval represents the actual time of
failure.
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The second adjustment that needs to be made accounts for those observations
that are right hand censored. The Kaplan-Meier method for quantile estimation will
account for those observations and will provide a more accurate estimate for the
empirical quantiles. This method also requires that each observation, censored and
uncensored, be ordered from smallest to largest. The empirical quantiles (Q.) are
computed using equation 3.3:
Qj=l-[(n + .5)/n] n [(n-k+.5)/(n-k+1.5)] for i in I (eqn 3.3)
kin I
k<i
where, I is the set of all uncensored observations, and n is the total number of
observations, censored and uncensored. [Ref 7: p. 234]
An exponential quantile-quantile plot was constructed for each of the nine
components studied. The quantile-quantile plots for work unit codes 734H100 and
56X2500 are displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. and the remaining quantile-quantile plots
are presented in Appendix F. The y-axis of the plot represents the quantiles, P(T:^t),
and the x-axis represents the time between component failures. The asterisks identify
the uncensored observations, the x 's identify- the locations of the censored
observations, and the theoretical distribution evaluated using X' is defined by the solid
line. The empirical data is fit well by the theoretical distribution if the data points are
tightly packed around the solid hne. Data points which deviate from the line can
provide information about areas of weakness.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the best exponential fit of all the quantile-quantile plots,
but the plot still shows the lower to mid quantiles associated with the empirical data
points overestimate the quantiles computed using the theoretical distribution. Figure
3.2 provides a better representation of the other quantile-quantile plots. In even.' plot,
the empirical quantiles overestimate the theoretical quantiles for quantiles less than .5,
and underestimate the theoretical quantile for quantiles greater than .75.
Figure 3.3 displays the WeibuU cumulative distribution function for a equal to
.5, 1, and 2. The reader should be aware that a WeibuU distribution with shape
parameter (a) equal to 1 is the exponential distribution. Figure 3.3 shows that for
values of time less than tg, the cumulative distribution for the curve represented by
a =.5 is greater than the exponential curve (a= 1), and for values of time greater than
tg it is less than the cumulative distribution of the exponential curve. This is the
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Figure 3.2 F:xponcntial Quantile-Quantile Plot: WL'C 56X2500.
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identical situation displayed in each of the nine quantile-quantile plots. This would
suggest that the distribution representing the time between component failures might
be better modelled with a WeibuU distribution with parameters, X>0 and < a < 1.
Figure 3.3 Weibull Cumulative Distribution Function.
C. WEIBULL MODEL
1. Properties
The next flight hour model that will be discussed is the Weibull distribution,
which can be a viable alternative to the exponential distribution since it is capable of
modelling many different failure rates. The major diflerence between the Weibull and
Exponential models is that the former is usually not "memor\'less", which indicates that
the component's previous usage can be exploited in the determination of the expected
failure time.
33
The two parameters associated uith the WeibuU distribution are the scale
parameter (X) and the shape parameter (a), with each shape parameter defining a
specific failure rate distribution. As such, the WeibuU family of distributions has the
capability to model many difierent types of component wear. For example, a values
greater than one describe a family of "WEAR OUT" distributions (increasing failure
rate functions); an a value equal to one describe the "NO WEAR" exponential: and a
values less than one describe a family of "WEAR IN" distributions (decreasing failure
rate functions). Consequently, the WeibuU distribution provides an additional
modeUing fiexibiUty that should reduce the latter two areas of concern associated with
the exponential distribution.
The WeibuU cumulative distribution function (Figure 3.3) and the exponential
quantile-quantile plots indicate that a WeibuU model with scale parameter (X>0) and
shape parameter (a<l) might provide appropriate descriptors of the failure rate
distribution for each of the components studied. As mentioned above, a shape
parameter less than one is indicative of a "WEAR IN" family of distributions.
Distributions of this type are characterized b\ a hazard rate function. r(t). which is
decreasing in t, (i.e., the component's failure rate decreases as t increases). Since, the
majority of components studied are electronic components (AVIONICS), this
assumption of a decreasing failure rate is probably an improvement over the constant
failure rate of the exponential model.
2. Maximum Likelihood Results
Maximum Ukelihood solutions can be obtained by setting the partials equal to
zero, and solving for X' and a' using nonlinear optimization techniques similar to the
one described in Appendix G. The partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function
with respect to the parameters X and a are displayed belowr
BK_^ aX«-'|(Ti4-ti)«-Ti«|ST-(ti) y^^a-l-j-a
dX \ l-S-pjt;) - )
The derivation of these equations is given in Appendix D.
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where, a,X>0; T-,t^,Tj^O; i= 1,2 m (the set of uncensored observations- failures);
and j = m+ l,m+2,...,n (the set of censored observations).
The maximum likelihood estimates for X' and a' were found using the
FORTRAN program listed in Appendix G. The parameter estimates and 95 percent
confidence limits for these estimates are displayed in Table 8.
TABLE 8
WEIBULL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS




46X1600 .0044 {.0006,.0082.) .6664 (.6627..6703)
4622100 .0066 (.0024,.0108) .7708 (.7666,.7750)
56X2500 .0119 (.0063,.0176) .8170 {.8114,.8227)
632Z100 .0067 (.0026,.0109) .7970 (.7928,.8011)
74A1500 .0165 • (.0084,.0246) .7066 {.6985,.7147)
74A5M00 .0164 (.0104,.0224) .8844 (.8784,.8904)
5772200 .0045 (.0009,.0082) .7385 (.7349,.7422)
6918100 .0112 (.0058,.0167)' .8142 (.8087,:8196)
*** CL = 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LIMITS
3. Quantile-Quantile Plots
The parameter estimates listed in Table 8 were used to construct Kaplan-
Meier quantile-quantile plots for each of the nine components studied. Two of these
quantile-quantile plots are displayed in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, and the other seven are
included in Appendix H. Both Figures graphically illustrate that the data is fit well by
the Weibull distribution, with the worst case fit represented by Figure 3.4. This plot
shows that the Weibull distribution has a tendency to underestimate the empirical
quantiles below ten percent, but fits the data extremely well for quantiles greater than
ten percent.
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The results of the Weibull quantile-quantile plots are not conclusive, but offer
credibility to the use of the Weibull model as an alternative method of modelling
component failure rates when flight time is the only contributing factor.
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Figure 3.5 Weibull Quantilc-Quantile Plot: WLC 56X2500.
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IV. SORTIE DEPENDENT MODELS
A. OVERVIEW
The two models that will be discussed in this chapter differ from the models in
Chapter III in that component failures can be affected by stresses incurred as a result
of the sortie.'^ These stresses refer to events that occur during each flight, regardless of
the sortie length, and would include events such as equipment initialization, takeoffs,
landings, etc. The first sortie-dependent model to be discussed is the Geometric model,
which determines a constant probability that a component fails on a given sortie.
The second sortie-dependent model that will be briefly looked at is the Vlixed
model described in reference 5. This model could also be classified as a flight hour
model since it determines the probability of a component failure based on both sortie
and flight hour contributing factors. It is incorporated in this section because it also
utilizes the geometric distribution to determine the probability that the first failure
occurs on the s sortie. The major difference between these two models is that the
Mixed model's probability of failure for a given sortie is not constant. In fact, it is a
function of a constant failure probability caused by sortie-related stress, and a
probability of failure which is dependent on the sortie length.
B. GEOMETRIC MODEL
1. Properties
The basic premise of the Geometric model is that the component failure
results due to sortie-related stress and is insensitive to differences in sortie length. This
assumption can then be used to formulate the component's survival or failure for a
given sortie as a Bernoulli trial, where, the component fails with probability p or
survives with probability 1-p. The geometric distribution is used to determine the
probability of observing the first failure on the s^^ Bernoulli trial.
The geometric distribution is in many ways similar to the exponential
distribution and might be considered the exponential's discrete analog. Like its
continuous counterpart, the geometric distribution is "memor\'less" and has a constant
failure rate, which would indicate that the Geometric model also ignores the history of
A sortie refers to one complete flight evolution, take-off to full-stop landing.
39
component usage. Any improvement ofTered by this model would be attributed to the
efiects of the sortie on the component's failure.
It should be apparent that a low variability in sortie length (i.e., the sortie
length is approximately constant) would imply that the exponential distribution is
equivalent to a geometric distribution with p= l-exp(-)tt); where t equals the average
sortie length. In this case, both models would provide similar estimates of component
failures. The flight data used to generate the parameter estimates was acquired from
aircraft flying during Flex-deck operations, and should have greater variability than
would be expected from aircraft flying under normal cyclic operations.^
2. Maximum Likelihood Results
The maximum likelihood expression for p', the estimate of the constant sortie
failure probability is given in equation 4.1:^
m
^' = 8:= 1,2,... i=1.2 n (eqn4.1)
y s
where, m represents the number of uncensored observations (sorties with component
failures), and the summation of the s-'s for i= 1.2,...,n represents the total number of
sorties flown. Thus, the maximum likelihood estimator p' equals the number of flights
experiencing a component failure divided by the total number of sorties flown. This is
the same maximum likelihood estimate which would have resulted without censoring.
The maximum likelihood estimates p' for p and the associated 95 percent confidence
intervals are listed in Table 9.
C. MIXED MODEL
1. Properties
This section will provide a brief description of the Mixed model proposed by
Le\7 [Ref 5]. This particular model is structured such that the sortie and the sortie
length (flight hours) can combine to cause a component failure. It is obvious that
factors contributing to one component's failure may or may not be detrunental to
another component's operating life. Most likely, "the life of electronic components is
probably affected more by the number of power surges to which they are subjected
"^Duruis Flex-deck operations, aircraft sortie length is not constrained to a one to
two hour launch and recover." cycle.
^The derivation of this equation is given in Appendix D.
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than operating hours; landing gear life should be influenced primarily by takeoffs and
landings; and engine life should be affected by rotational speed changes, which are
accompanied by heat transients and pressure changes" [Ref 8: p. 2]. The Mixed model
appears to have an increased flexibilty to model some of these sortie and flight hour
factors.
As in the previous section, a constant probability of failure is employed to
model the effects of sortie induced stress. In addition, the Mixed model incorporates a
failure probability for those components whose lifetime is affected by the flight hours
fiowTi. Combining the constant sortie failure probability with the flight hour probability
results in the expression for the probability of failure p- for the i sortie, which is
expressed as the complement of a component surviving the stresses of the sortie and
the flight hours flown:
Pi= l.exp(-^)(l.pQ) 0<pQ<l,X>0,t->0 (eqn4.2)
where, the flight hour failure distribution is exponential and p equals the constant
sortie failure probability. -
2. Maximum Likelihood Results
The partial derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to the
parameters X and p^ are listed below:^
^K ^ {l-p_)t:exp(-}lt:) ^
— = y ^ ' ^ - T; - y T: (eqn 4.3)
dX X l-exp(->.t^)(l-pQ) 1 j- J ^ 4 ;
^K exp(->.t:) S:-I S:
— = y -—
^
i X ^- (eqn 4.4}
^p^ Yl-expl-Xtpd-p^) 1-p^ Y 1-p^
where, 0<Pq<1; X>0; T-,t-,T:>0; sj=l,2,...; i= l,2,...,m (the set of uncensored
observations - failures); and j = m+ l,m+2,....n (the set of censored observations).
Maximum likelihood solutions for X' and p ' were obtained using the
FORTR.A.N program listed in Appendix G. For each of the nine components studied.
the log-likelihood function was maximized when X' equaled zero, and p - equaled p',
the maximum likelihood estimate for the constant failure rate p of the Geometric
The derivation of these equations is given in Appendix D.
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model. The results for X' are included in Table 9. The reader should note that the
values for p' and Pq' are identical, and the failure for X is zero for every component.
Since both models provide the same maximum likelihood results, they will be jointly




wuc p'** CLp X'* CLX
734H100 .0301 (.0188,.0414) .0000 (.0000,.0055)
46X1600 .0097 {.0038, .0156) .0000 (.0000,.0027)
4622100 .0140 {.0069,.0211) .0000 (.0000,.0034)
56X2500 .0244 (.0147,.0341) .0000 {.0000,.0047)
' 632Z100 .0140 (.0069,.02ll) .0000' {.0000..0033)
74AI500 .0307 {.0191,.0423) .ooco (.0000,.0056)
74A5M00 .0338 (.0228,.0448) .0000 (.0000,.0053)
5772200 .0097 (.0037,.0l57) .0000 (.0000,.0028)
6918100 .0232 (.0137,.0327) .0000 {.0000,.0045)
CL= 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LIMITS






The purpose of this chapter is to compare the Exponential model with the
Weibull and Geometric models to determine if the distribution currently used provides
the most accurate description of the failure process. As a method of comparison, the
Chi-square goodness-of-fit test was not considered for two reasons. First, the failure
rate information provided by the censored observations would have been lost because
of the impossibihty of determining the exact time of component failure. Second, it was
considered more important to examine* each model's capability to predict the number
of component failures resulting from a specified number of sorties and flight hours
flown. The next section describes the methods of estimating failures for each model.
These estimates are then compared with the actual number of failures to determine
each model's goodness-of-fit.
B. COMPONENT FAILURE ESTIMATION
1. Geometric Model
The determination of the expected number of component failures -associated
with the Geometric model is straightforward. The parameter p estimated using the
Geometric model defines the probability that a component would fail during a given
sortie. Furthermore, if it is assumed that the outcome of a sortie is independent of the
outcome of the other N-1 sorties, and p is constant for each sortie, then the probability
law defining the number of component failures for the deployment is the sum of N
independent Bernoulli trials. This random sum has a Binomial distribution with an
expected value equal to N x p. Thus, using the Geometric model the expected number
of component failures is calculated as the product of the number of sorties flown (N)
and the probability that the component fails during the sortie.
2. Exponential Model
To compute the expected number of component failures using the Exponential
model, each failure can be thought of as an occurrence within a Renewal process; a
stochastic process which counts the number of occurrences within an interval {0,t]. It is
assumed that the times between successive occurrences are independently and
identically distributed non-negative random variables. As such, it can be shown that
the expected number of occurrences within an interval (0,t] is equal to:
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'^(0 = lFi,(t) k= 1,2,3,...
k
where, M(t) equals the expected number of occurrences (failures) within the interval
(0,t], and Fj^(t) is the k-fold convolution of the cumulative distribution function. The
derivative of M(t) with respect to t defines the renewal rate of the process as:
M'(t) = m(t) = Xrk(^) ^=12,3,...
k
Since the k-fold convolution of the exponential probability density function is known
to be Gamma, m(t) is equal to the infinite sum of Gamma probability density functions
with scale parameter X and shape parameter k.
^k^k-l,-Lx (^^^k-l
m(t) = V = Xq-^^ y k= 1,2,3,...
t r(k) J- r(k)
In the equation above, Y [(X,x) ,T{k)] for k= 1.2.3,... is easilv recognized as the
Taylors senes expans,on"of e^^. Thus, the renewal rate for the counting process
.defined by exponential interoccurrence times is X. The expected number of" failures
M(t) is found by integrating m{t) from to t.
t
M(t) = JX ds = >.t
Therefore, the expected number of component failures is equal to the product of the
failure rate X and the time on test t. This particular Renewal process is referred to as a
Poisson process.
3. Weibull Model
Estimating the number of expected failures associated with the Weibull model
is not as easy as the other methods discussed above. The observation of component
failures is still a Renewal process, but the interoccurrence times are distributed
according to a more complex distribution function. Finding the k-fold convolution of
either the cumulative distribution function or the probability density function is an
extremely dilTicult if not impossible task. For processes defined by continuous
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interevent times with finite means and variances, the Elementary Renewal Theorem
states that M{t) is approximately Normal with mean = t/n and variance =t(y^;H-^ as t
approaches infinity [Ref, 9: p. 290]. Unfortunately, this theorem does not help estimate
failures when t is small. As an alternate method to construct M(t) when t is small, a
simple computer simulation is used.
The inputs required for the simulation included the number of aircraft
assigned to the carrier air wings, the Weibull shape and scale parameters, and an
approximate flight hour distribution. This information was used to repeatedly simulate
the air wing operations during the deployment.
The aircraft were chosen at random to fly a fictitious mission of some sortie
length t. For the modelling set, there were 30 aircraft assigned. The model assumed
that each aircraft had an equally likely (1/30 percent) probability of being chosen to fly
a mission. Realistically, aircraft are not chosen at random to fly missions, and most
hkely those aircraft recently flown are better prepared for future flights. A weighting
scheme could have been used to increase the probabilities of those aircraft flown
recently, and decrease the probability for those aircraft that were undergoing simulated
maintenance activities.
The duration of the mission was determined by a random variable generated
from a Normal distribution with the mean and variance estimated by the Model data
set (see Table 6). Figure 5.1 depicts a histogram of the sortie lengths for the Model set
with an overlay of the appropriate Normal distribution. Between the values of Q to 6
hours, the Normal distribution fits the histogram adequately enough to justify its use
as the sortie length's parent distribution. Values of randomly-generated sortie lengths
less than .5 hours or greater than 6 hours were truncated to .5 hours and 6 hours,
respectively.
After the selection of aircraft, the conditional probability of failure was
computed for a flight of sortie length t. The only information required for this
computation was the component's Weibull shape and scale parameters, and the
aircraft's flight histor\' since the last component failure. The conditional probability of
failure could then be calculated as described in Appendix D. The value for the
conditional probability of failure was then compared against a Uniform (0,1) random
variable, and if the uniformly-generated outcome was less than or equal to the




Figure 5.1 Sortie Lengtli Histogram vs Normal Distribution.
The number of component failures was recorded- at 500 hour intervals until
the completion of the deployment. The deployment was simulated 100 times, and the
average number of component failures was computed for each 500 hour interval. These
averages were the approximations to the expected number of component failures M(t)
at 500,1000,1500,... hours etc.
C. COMPARISONS
1. Methodology
The predicted failures were compared with the actual failures as they occurred
in each of the two deployments (IJSS KENNEDY and LSS INDEPENDENCE). At
this point, it is important to clarify the specific calculations of the expected failures. As
described earlier, the accumulated fiight time and total sorties flown were recorded with
the observation of each failure. Ihcrefore. the exponential and geometric expected
lailurcs could be computed Ubing the formulas listed in this chapter. Unfortunately, the
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expected number of WeibuU component failures was not always defined at the
accumulated flight time of the actual failure. To provide such an estimate, it was
necessary to interpolate^ between the WeibuU expected failures associated with the
simulated failure times above and below the actual time of component failure. The
difference between the expected and actual failures was computed at the time of each
component failure. These differences were then summed and divided by the total
number of component failures to provide an estimate of the average prediction error.
An average difference close to zero, with small standard deviation, indicates that the
model is a good predictor of actual failures. A negative average shows that the model
has a tendency to underestimate the number of component failures, and a positive
average is indicative of overestimation. Tables 10 and 11 provide the average
differences and corresponding standard deviations for the "model" and "validation" data
sets respectively.
The model providing the best fit for a specific component was chosen based
on the average difierence between the predicted failures and the actual failures. Table
12 provides a summary listing- of the optimal distributions for each component in both
data sets. The reader is cautioned that the optimal was chosen based on an average
difference closest to zero, and in some cases the expected number of failures was
adequately described by other distributions as well as the one listed as optimal. If two
or more models provided similar estimates, the one with the smallest standard deviation
was chosen as optimal. The actual failures were plotted against the predicted failures to
further illustrate a distribution's ability or disability to estimate failures. These graphs
are included in Appendix I.
2. Results
Before proceeding with the comparisons, a caveat should be placed on the
results. The ability of the models to predict the failures observed during the deployment
of the "validation" data set is contingent on the accuracy of the model parameter
estimates. For a valid comparison, it is necessary that both deployments come from the
same population. That is to say, the flight operations were conducted under similar
conditions. The reader should be aware that the "model" set aircraft and the
"validation" set aircraft operated during different seasons and in different geographic
locations. The parameters estimated from the "model" set may or may not provide the
A quadratic interpolation of the form aFT^ + bFT + c= EF was used. Where. FT
equaled accumulated fliizht time of failure. EF equaled expected failures, and a.b.c were
parameters estimated using the known WeibuU times and expected failures.
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TABLE 10
























































































true estimate of the population parameters required to accurately predict failures within
the "validation" data set.
Within the "model" set, all of the models predict failures adequately. This is
not unexpected because the parameters dcfming the distribution were estimated using
the fliaht data from the "model" set. Table 1 1 shows that this is not true for the
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TABLE 11
























































































deployment defined by the "validation" data set. In most cases, a single optimal model
can be identified.
Table 10 illustrates an extremely minor diflerence between the e.xponential and
geometric estimates. In fact, it could be argued the geometric and the exponential were














Inertial Measuring Unit (WUC:734H100), the optimal distribution is Usted as
exponential for the "model" set and geometric for the "validation" set, but it could have
been geometric in both cases. During the deployment represented by .the "vaUdation"
data set the average sortie length increased by approximately S.5 percent. As
mentioned earlier, the exponential distribution is insensitive to changes in the average
sortie length and would provide an estimate based on flight hours only. On the other
hand, if the geometric distribution was correct the longer sortie lengths would imply
that a specific flight hour total was accompUshed with fewer sorties flown. It would
provide a smaller estimate than would the Exponential model. For Work Unit Code
734H100, the Exponential model was unable to account for the longer average sortie
length (in the "validation" set) and overestimated the actual number of failures.
The Geometric model appears to provide the best fit for components that are
not necessarily operated continuously. Examples of components of this type would
include the AWG-Q Radar Transmitter (WUC:74A1500) and Detail Data Display
(WUC:74A5M00). A possible exception to this rule would be the Inertial Measuring
Unit (WUC:734H100). Despite its continuous use, the Inertial Measuring Unit's gyros
and accelerometers are extremely sensitive to the movements and impacts associated
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with carrier takeofis and landings, and it is extremely likely that component failures are
caused by sortie-related stress vice continuous flight operations.
For continuous use components within the "validation" data set, the WeibuU
distribution provided the best estimate of component failures. The exponential
distribution was the optimal predictor for only one component (WUC:6918100). and in
that case, the WeibuU distribution was nearly as accurate. From a readiness
standpoint, the WeibuU model might be considered a better choice because of its
tendency to overestimate the actual number of failures. Amazingly, the exponential
distribution predicted failures best for less than 10 percent of the components within
the "vaUdation" data set. In support of the current model, it should be noted that the
exponential's estimate of failures was more than adequate for the "model" set.
As mentioned previously, the WeibuU distribution with shape parameter equal
to one is exponential. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the capabUity of the WeibuU simulation
to provide estimates similar to those generated for the Exponential model. This figure
shows the WeibuU and exponential predictions for the DetaU Data Display
(WUC:74A5M00) with estimated WeibuU shape parameter equal to .91.
It should not be surprising that in some cases, none of the models will be
adequate estimators of the actual failures. This type of phenomenon was observed for
the Fuel Tank Release Mechanism (WUC:4622100). For two successive deployments,
total failures went from 49 to 6 for a similar number of flight hours and sorties flown.
Based on the available data, it is hard to determine if 49 was too high or 6 was too
low. This type of outcome emphasizes the difficulty in predicting the actual failures for
an upcoming deployment based on parameters estimated from one deployment rather
than the entire historical data base.
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Figure 5.2 Flight Hour Models: Model Set WUC:74A5M00.
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VI. SUMMARY
A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
This section provides a brief summary of the primary advantages and
disadvantages associated with each of the four models discussed in Chapters III and
IV. The major advantage of the Exponential and Geometric models is that the number
of expected failures is easily calculated using closed form expressions. Both models
express failures as a linear function of only one factor, flight hours (Exponential) or
sorties flown (Geometric). There is a tendency then to concentrate on aggregate flight
totals while ignoring the specific flight history of each aircraft. As a result, neither
model is able to adjust its failure estimates to compensate for differences in flight
programs.
The Mixed model, on the other hand, attempts to account for failures resulting
from sortie stress and; or continuous use. Unlike the previous models, the expected
number of component failures is a function of a specific flight program. The
probability of failure associated with the Vlixed model is a function oi" the sortie
duration. As such, this model should be more sensitive to difTerences in flight*
programs and would provide a more accurate estimate of failures than the Exponential
and Geometric models. Use of the Exponential distribution to model continuous-use
components has weakened the forecasting" capabilities of the Vlixed model. Lack of
consideration for flight hours flown since the last component failure oversimplifies the
problem. As stated previously, the small variability in sortie length combined with the
"memoryless" property of the Exponential distribution would imply that the probability
of night hour induced failure is approximately constant for all sorties flown. Since the
stress related failure probability is also constant, this model would not necessarily
predict any better than the Geometric model. This type of phenomenon was observed
in this study.
The WeibuU's strongest feature is its ability to model failure rates for components
which have increasing, decreasing, or constant failure rates. Since it does not possess
the memor>'less property of the Exponential/Geometric models, the expected number of
failures is dependent upon previous flight histories. Like the Mixed model, this should
provide an improved estimate of component failures. One disadvantage is a lack of
S^
simple mathematical formulas with which to calculate the expected failures. However,
in today's world of computers this should not be a major problem.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of component failures which
occur during a deployment based solely on the data provided by another deployment.
Such an approach would not account for differences in flight and maintenance
personnel, weather conditions, geographical location, mission type, aircraft's
maintenance histor>', etc. For example, the number of actual failures observed for the
Fuel Tank Release Mechanism went from forty-nine to six for a similar number of
flight hours and sorties flown. To minimize the effects caused by such variations in
deployments it is recommended that these models be evaluated using an enlarged data
base.
Surprisingly, in this study, the model currently used by the Nav\' (Exponential)
did not provide the best estimate of component failures. The Geometric provided a
better fit for components which were not operated continuously, and the WeibuU.
performed better when the components were operated continuously. In fact, overall,
the Exponential was the least effective model for these nine components.
The results obtained, using the Weibull simulation were encouraging." The model
produced satisfactory' estimates with a minimal number of assumptions, data input, and
software coding. While the results obtained using this model were not overwhelming,
an improvement in prediction capability was observed.
Two possible directions for improving the current method of estimating demand
(i.e., component failures) are the construction of a universal model and the use of high
resolution simulations. The first alternative suggests the use of a model which can
describe components with different failure rate functions, and incorporates a
methodology utilizing soriie-induced stress and flight hours flown to compute an
estimate of component failures. The model currently used does not have this
capability.
A slight modification to the Mixed model described in Chapter IV might provide
the modelling flexibility desired. A failure rate distribution, such as the Weibull, could
be used to describe continuous-use failures instead of the Exponential. Such a change
would ensure that the component's failure probability could be influenced by prior use.
That is to say. the probability of failure for a given sortie would now be a function of
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the sortie length and the aggregate flight time since the last component failure. The
strengths of the Weibull distribution combined with the constant probability of failure
(sortie) associated with the Mixed model should provide an estimate of demand which
is more sensitive to variations within and between flight programs.
The price paid for this improvement in forecasting ability is an increase in the
complexity of the expected demand computations. With the abundance of computers
within the fleet this should not be a problem. Perhaps, ten to twenty years ago it was
necessary to rely on simple models for prediction and the crude estimates they
provided. This is not the case today; computer simulations can be used when simple
mathematical formulas are not available. As described in Chapter V, a low resolution
simulation was used to forecast the component failures associated with the Weibull
renewal process. The advantage of such simulations is the ability to include other
factors which may afiect a component's failure rate. Examples of these factors would
include number and type of landings, mission type, maintenance programs, weather
conditions, etc. It is safe to say. that these more coniplicated, high resolution models
could include more information about the factors which cause components to fail, and





00 Used to report an inventor>' gain.
02 Used to report a change in the readiness reportable
status of an equipment.
03 Used to report an equipment loss.
11 a. On-equipment work not involving a removal or
replacement of a defective component or item.
b. On supprotine ensine documents not havins a removal
of a defective or^suspected defective component or item
when the ensine is not specifically identified to a
• specific aircraft.
c. Used at the O or I level maintenance activities when
closing out a maintenance action.
12 On-equipment work, including eneines. involving non-
repairable components items aocifmented as failed parts.
14 Removal of a nondefectiye component item, excluoins
cannibalization. from-an eneine to be processed at the
O-level maintenance activity.
15 Installation of a nondefective. component, item.
eJccludine cannibalization. on an engine to be processed
at an O-Tevel maintenance activity.
"
16 Removal of a nondefective component/item, excluding
engine components items and a cannibalization to be
processed at an O-level maintenance activity.
17 Installation of a nondefective component/item
excluding engine component items and cannibalization.
18 a. The removal and replacement of nondefective
engines and component, items to accomplish a
cannibalization action.
b. The removal and replacement of those consumeable
components items subject to a scheduled removal interval
or items of supplv significance.
c. The removal and replacement of a nondefective engine
component for cannibalization at the 1-level only.
19 a. The removal and replacement of nondefective
engine component to accomplish a cannibalization at the
O-Tevel onlv.
b. The removal and replacement of those consumeable
engine components sumect to a scheduled removal interval
orItems of supply significance.
21 Will be used when a repairable component is removed.
excluding engine components, for processing at an I or D
level niafntenance activitv (This code is used when
only the removal must be documented and a replacement
is not required).
23 Removal and replacement of a defective or suspected
defective component from an end item, excluding engines
at the O-lcvel.
Additionally, this code is used for the removal and
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replacement of a complete engine assembly for a defect,
suspected defect, or scheduled maintenance requirement.
24 Will be used when a repairable engine component
is removed for processing at an I or D level activity
(This code is used when onlv the removal must be
documented and a replacement is not required).
25 Removal and replacement of a defective or suspected
defective repairaole component from an engine.
30 Used to document components processed through the
I-level maintenance activity for check, test, and"
service.
31 Work performed on a removed repairable component with
no failed parts or awaitine parts documented in the
Failed/Required Material mocks of the VIDSMAF.
32 Work performed on a removed repairable component with
failed parts, awaitine parts, or cannibalization
actions documented m the Failed/Required Material
blocks.




Technical directive compUance with no part number
change.
47 Technical directive compliance with a part number
change.
72 Will be useed to report SCIR data bv the reportine
custodian when transient maintenance is peribrmea bv





1 BCM - maintenance activity not authorized to conduct
repair
2 BCM - Lack of equipment, tools, or facilities
3 BCM - Lack of technical skills necessary to complete
repair
4 BCM - Lack of parts
5 BCVI - Fails check and test, and maintenance is allowed
to conduct check and test only
6 BCM - Lack of technical data
7 BCM - Beyond the authorized repair depth ;
8 BCM - Administrative
9 BCM -Condemned, repair not feasible
A Items of repairable Vlaterial or Weapon Support
Svstem Discrepencv Checked No Repair Required. This
code IS used for ail'discrepencies which are checked
and found that either the reported deficiencv cannot
be duplicated, or is operating within allowable
tolerances.
B Repair or replacement of attaching units, seals.-
gasKets. etc.. that are not integral parts of work
unit coded items.
C This code is used when a repairable item of material
identified by a work unit code is repaired.
D This code is used to closeout a VIDSMAF when
component repair is to be peribrmed at another facility.
F Failure of components'items undergoing test.
J This code is used when an item is calibrated and found
serviceable without need for adjustment.
K This code is used when an item must be adjusted to
meet calibration standards.
L This code is used when a maintenance action must
be stopped or delaved while awaiting parts which are
not available locallv. and a component goes into
an awaiting parts status.
N This code is used bv an organizational activitv
when it becomes ne"cessar\^to closeout a maintenance
action during or at the end of a reporting period
for any reason.
P This code is entered when an item of material is
removed and onlv the removal is to be accounted for.
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Q This code is entered when an item is installed and
only the installation action is to be accounted for.
R This code is entered when an item of material is
removed due to suspected malfunction and the same or a
like item is reinstalled.
S This code is entered when an item of material is
removed to facilitate other maintenance and the same
item is reinstalled.
T This code is used when an item of material is
removed and replaced for a cannibalization action.
Y This code is used when the time expended in locating
a discrepency is great enough to warrant separating
the troublesnoot time from the repair time.
Z This code is used when actually treating corroded






A Before flight - mission aborted - failure discovered by aircrew
B Before flight - no abort - failure discovered by aircrew
C Inflight - mission aborted
D. Inflight - no abort
E After flight between flight - failure discovered by aircrew
F Pilot/NFO weekly inspection
G Acceptance/transfer inspection
H Between flights - failure discovered by ground crew
J Daily inspection
K Preflight. daily; preflight, postflight, or turnaround inspection
L Special inspection
M Calender odd/major/phase inspection




R Quality assurance inspection
S Oil analysis inspection
U Modification, SDLM, Overhaul/Airline maintenance
V Related maintenance action
W In-shop repair; disassembly for maintenance
X Test bench/engine test stand operation




1. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATORS
a. Properties
The method used in this thesis to estimate the model parameters is maximum
likelihood. As such, it is necessary to review two important properties of this estimator.
First, if a random sample of size n is taken of a random variable X whose probability
mass function, p{x), depends on an unknown parameter, 0, then the probability law for
the maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically normal (as n gets large) with:
MEAN = e and VARIANCE = (nK^)-^ (eqn D.l)
where, K'^= E[{(5/^G)lnp(x))^] for a discrete random variable X, and n equals the total
number of observations. Thus, the maximum likelihood- estimator is asymptotically
unbiased: that is, the expected value of the estimator is equal to the unknown
parameter 0. Furthermore, the variance of the estimator is the Cramer-Rao lower
bound, and represents the smallest possible variance of an unbiased estimator.
[Ref 10: pp. 372,379]
The second property describes the probability law for maximum likelihood
estimators when the X.'s for i= 1 n are not identicallv distributed. In the models
1
'
discussed in this thesis, the probability mass function for each X. was dependent on
one or more other random variables. Nevertheless, the distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimator(s) is still asymptotically normal with:
MEAN = and VARIANCE = (Y Kj^)'! (eqn D.2)
i
where, Kj'-= E[((^/^0)lnp(x))"] is evaluated using the specific parameters defining the
i observation. The difTerence in the variance in equation D.l and the variance in
equation D.2 is caused by probability mass functions for the X-'s which are not
identically distributed. For a complete derivation of this result, the reader is referred to
W. J. Heintzelman's 1975 paper on Determining the Failure Rate When Failure Times
Are Not Known Exactly [Ref llj.
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b. Confidence Intervals
Confidence intervals for the unknown parameters can then be calculated using
the maximum likelihood's probability law described in the previous section. These
limits are defined as:
CONFIDENCE LIMITS = 6'±(zi.a/2 ^ ^6 )
where, 8' is the maximum likelihood estimator for 0, Cq' is the standard deviation of
the maximum likelihood estimator, and Zj_q/2 is the l-a/2 quantile of the standard
normal distribution.
c. Formulation of Probability Mass Functions
The generalized format used to construct each model's probability mass function for X-
is:
p(.x.) = [P{ failure occurred)] '^i x [P( right hand censored)]^!
The random variable, X., is an indicator variable equal to zero if the data entr\'
contains a failure, and equal to one if the observation is right b.and censored.^ The





Total number of records in the final data set
Total number of records containing component failures
Tot^l number of records which were right hand censored
2. EXPONENTIAL MODEL
a. Properties
The probability density function f(t), survival function S(t), and hazard rate




^Risht hand censored observations identify those components that did not fail
to the termination of the deployment.prior
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b. Formulation of the Maximum Likelihood Equation
This section outlines the formulation of the maximum likelihood equation
used to find X', the maximum likelihood estimate for the failure rate parameter X. The
final data set contains information supporting two record types. The first record type
identifies observations of components failing during some specified interval of time. T-
to T- + t-. The probability equation representative of this type of record is given in
equation D.3.
P(Tj<t<Ti + tj)=exp(-XTi)x(l.exp(-Xti)) (eqn D.3)
The second record type pertains to an observation of a component surviving
past some time T-. These censored observations contain no information regarding the
actual time of component failure. Equation D.4 defines the probability relationship




The probability mass function, p{Xj), for the Exponential model is obtained by
combining equations D.3 .and D.4. The random variable X. equals zero when a failure
is observed and one when the data is right hand censored (i.e., component survived
until the end of the deployment).
p(Xi) = [exp(-XT.)r^i X [exp(-XTi) x (l.exp(-Xtj)/l-V (eqn D.5)
where.
Xj=[0,l}, X>0, andTj. tj>0
T- equals the aggregate flight time \vithout component failure for the ith record
tj equals the fiight duration of the sortie during which the failure was observed
The likelihood function for p(Xj), L(p(x-)) can be expressed as the product of
the n probability mass functions. The maximum likelihood estimate for X is the value
of X' which maximizes L(p(x-)). Since the logarithmic function is a monotonically
increasing function, the X' which maximizes L(p(x-)) is identical to the X' which
maximizes the log-likelihood function K(p(x-)). The optimal value for X' is found by
taking the derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to X, setting it equal to
zero, and solving for X.
Likelihood function:
L(p(Xj)) = n [exp(->.Tj)]'^i X [exp(-XTi) x (l.exp{-Xtj)](l-^i) (eqn D.6)
i= 1,2,3, .••,n
Log-likelihood function:
K(p(Xi)) =X - XJ.x.. XT.{\-x.) + (l-Xj)log[l-exp(.Xtj)] (eqn D.7)
i
The partial derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to X is:
dK ^ [(l-x.H.exp(-Xt.)]
_=y .T.x. -T.(l-x.) + ^^^ '-^-^—'— (eqnD.8)
^X f • • •' '' [l-exp(-Xtj)]
^
Equation D.9 is the result of setting Equation D.8 equal to zero and
rearranging the summations to eliminate the x-(s). The left hand side of Equation D.9
is summed over the set (i) of all records, censored and uncensored. But, the right hand
side is only summed for the uncensored observations (j).
^ ^ t.exp(-Xt.) T;,t:>0. X>0, m<nVt. = V_lJ_! L_ 1'] (eqn D.9)
Y ' Y l-exp(-Xt) 1=1.2 n j=l,2,...,m
c. Maximum Likelihood Variance
As stated in Section D.l, the maximum likelihood estimator for X is
approximately normally distributed with mean equal to X and variance equal to 1 '^K."
for i= l,...,n. In this model:
(t.exp(-Xt.) - T.)^ -y
Kf =
, ;,
' X [exp(-XTi) X exp( -Xtp] + T-exp(-XTi)
' l-exp(-Xt') ^ 1 i 1
where, Kj^ is evaluated using the maximum likelihood estimate of X (i.e., X = X'). The
standard deviation of the maximum Ukelihood estimator and associated confidence




The probability density function f^t), survival function S(t), and hazard rate
function r(t) for the Weibull distribution are displayed below.
n;t)=>.*^at^-^exp[-(Xt)"] X, a>0 t>0
S(t) = exp[-{>.t)«]
r(t) = X«at«-^
b. Formulation of the Maximum Likelihood Equation
This section describes the formulation of the equation used to find the
maximum likelihood estimates of the Weibull scale (X) and shape (a) parameters. The
two different record types supporting this equation are identical to those identified in
the preceding section. The key difference between the two models is that the Weibull
distribution possesses the "memor\'less" property for a equal to one only. As such, the
conditional survival probability is usually not equal to the unconditional survival







The conditional probability of failure during the interval T. to T. + 1. can be
expressed as l-Sj(tj), the complement of the conditional survival probability. The
i
probability mass function for the Weibull model is then formed by combining the
conditional probability of a component failure within the interval Tj to Tj-i-t- (x- = 0)
with the probability that a component survives time T- (x- = 1).
p{Xi)=[l-S-j-_(ti)]l-\ X exp[-{XTj)Yi (eqn D.ll)
where,
• x.= {0,l}, X>0, andT.. t.>0
Tj equals the aggregate fiight time without component failure for the ith record
.
The subscripted T: is used to indicate the conditional survival probabilitv
associated with a component that has survived T: hours of operation.
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• t- equals the flight duration of the sortie during which the failure was observed
The log-likelihood function, K(p(Xj)), is:




The partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function, K(p(x.)), with respect to the
parameters X and a are displayed below. They have been simplified by removing the
x-(s) and summing over the appropriate records. The set i= 1,2, 3,. ..,n represents all data
records (censored and uncensored), and the set j = m+ l,m+2,...,n includes only those
records which are censored.
aK ^ aX«-'|(T, + t,)«-Ti«|ST.(t,) ^^^„.,^„
dx 7 i-Sjitj) Y '
i • =
.
eK_^ i[X-(T, + ti)|«loglX(Ti + ti)l-(>.T,)"log(?.T,)S-r.(t,)
V(),T)«lo«).T)
.sa Y i-s-r.it;) , f y -^ y
c. Maximum Likelihood Variance
The following equations were used to compute the variance for the maximum
likelihood estimators, X,' and a'. These variances were then used to construct the
confidence limits displayed in Table 8.
K-^ with respect to X':




K- with respect to a':
. ([[MTi + ti)]«log[X(Ti + ti)HXTi)«log(XTi)}Sy(tj))2








The probability mass function, Pr{F=s), and survival function, Pr(F>s), for the
Geometric distribution are given below.
Pr(F=s) = pq^"^ 0<p<l, q=l-pand s= 1,2,3,..
.
Pr(F>s)=q^'^
where, F is the random variable representing the observation of the first failure, and q
is the probability of the component surviving the sortie. Equations D.13 and D.14
illustrate the Geometric distribution's "memor>'less" and constant failure rate properties
respectively.
Pr{F>a4-b/F>a) = (q^^^Vq''^ = q^* = Pr,(F>b) (eqn D.13)
Pr(F=s);Pr(F>s) = (pq^-^)/q^"^ = p (eqn D.14)
b. Formulation of the Maximum Likelihood' Equation
This section formulates the equation used to find the maximum likelihood
estimate of the constant failure probability (p) associated with any given sortie. For
the Geometric model, the two event types which can occur include components failing
during the s sortie, or components failing during some unknown sortie after the s^
sortie. The probability expression associated with the first type of event is given in
equation D.15, and equation D.16 defines the relationship for those observations where
the component survived at least s sorties.
Pr(F=s) = pq^-1 (eqn D.15)
— ^sPr(F>s) = q^ {eqn D.16)
The probability mass function for this model is obtained by combining
equations D.15 and D.16. Again, X is allowed to take the values zero and one only,
with zero indicating a component failure on the s sortie and a one indicating a
component failure after the s sortie.
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p(Xi)=[p(l-p)VA]A-^ X [{\.p)h]\ (eqn D.17)
where,
• 0<p<l,q=l-p, s-= 1,2,3,...
• s- equals the aggregate number of sorties flown inclusive of the sortie causine
the failure when" xp= and equals the aggregate number of sorties without a
component failure when x-= 1
The maximum likelihood estimate p' of the unknown sortie failure rate will be
found by taking the derivative of the log-likelihood function [K(p(x-))] with respect to
p, setting the derivative equal to zero and solving for p.
K{p(Xi)) = V (1-Xi)ln{p) + {Si-l)(I-xpin(l-p) + s-Xjln(l-p) (eqn D.18)
i
i= 1,2.3 n
^K_ (l-x^) [(s--l)(l-x-)] (S-X-)
.
dp Y P <1-P> (1-P^
The partial derivative listed above can be simplified by removing the indicator
variables and adjusting the suminations to produce the closed form expression for p'
given in equation D.19.
vi + _l. = v_!L




where, j= 1,2,3,. ..,m is the set of uncensored records (i.e., component failures), and
i= 1,2,3 n is the set of all records, censored and uncensored. Thus, the maximum
likelihood estimator p' equals the number of flights experiencing a component failure
divided by the total number of sorties flown,
c. Maximum Likelihood Variance
The maximum likelihood estimator's variance was computed using the
formulas described in Section DT. The equation defining the Geometric model's
i
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expression for K/- is given below:
Ki^ = [(l-psi)2(l.p)V3]/p + Sj2(l.p)V2 (eqn D.20)
where, K- is evaluated at p = p'. These variances were used to compute the confidence
limits listed in Table 9.
5. MIXED MODEL
a. Properties
Combining a constant sortie failure probability, p^, with a flight hour probability
distribution results in an expression for the probability of failure, p-, for the i^^ sortie.
This is expressed as the complement of a component surviving both the stresses of the
sortie and the flight hours flown:
p-= l-exp(->.t-)(l-pQ) 0<Po<l.X>0,t^>0 (eqnD.21)
where, the flight hour failure distribution is Exponential.
The model is then formulated in the same manner as the Geometric model
describe4 in the preceding section. The probability that the first failure occurs on the
s sortie is e;
for i= l,...,s-l.
xpressed in equation D.22. Note that the p^^^. are not necessarily equal
Pr(F= s) = p_ n (I-pi) i= l,2,...,s-I (eqn D.22)
i
Equation D.23 results from using the expression for p- given in equation D.21
to rewrite equation D.22.
Pr(F=s) = [l-exp(-Xt)(l-pQ)][(l-pQ)S-lexp(-XT)] T-,t->0 (eqn D.23)
b. Formulation of the Maximum Likelihood Equation
This section describes the formulation of the equation used to find the
maximum likelihood estimates for the failure rate parameter (X) and the constant sortie
probability of failure (p^). The probability relationship supporting the observation of
the first failure on the s*-" sortie is given in equation D.23, and the expression for the
observation of a failure at some unknown time after s sortie is listed below.
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Pr{F> s) = n (1-p:) = exp(-X.T){l.p_)S (eqn D.24)
1
' ^
The probability mass function p(Xj) for this model results from combining
equations D.23 and D.24. Notice that when X equals zero the probability mass
function for the Mixed model is identical to the probability mass function expressed for
the Geometric model in equation D.17, and when p^ equals zero the probability mass
function is equivalent to the. Exponential probability mass function given in equation
D.5. The above statement implies that the Mixed model has the capability of
modelling the Geometric or Exponential cases as the situation would require.
p{Xj)= [[l-exp(-Xti)(l-pQ)][(l-pQ)Srlexp(.XT^)]}l-^ x [(l.p^)^-, exp(-XT^)]^
where.
• 0<Pq< 1, ;.>0, s— 1,2,3 and J., tj>0
• T- equals the aggregate flight time without component failure for the ith record
• tj equals the flight duration of the sortie during which the failure was observed
• S; equals the aggregate number of sorties flowTi inclusive of the sortie causing
the failure when x:'"= and equals the aggregate number of sorties without a
component failure when x-= 1.
The log-likelihood function K(p(x-)), and the partial derivatives of the log-
likelihood functions with respect to the parameters X and p^ are given below. The
maximum likelihood estimates for "k and p^ were obtained utilizing the Quasi-Newton
method described in Appendix G. The log-likelihood function, K(p(x-)), is:
K(p(x-)) = y ( l-xp{ln[ l-exp(-Xt-)( I-Pq)] + [(s--l)ln(l-Po)]-XTi} + x- {[Sjln(l-Po)]-XT^}
i
i=l,2,3,...,n
The partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function, K(p(x.)), have been simplified by
removing the x-(s) and summing over the appropriate records. The set i= 1,2,3 n
represents all data records (censored and uncensored), and the set j = m+ l,m-f- 2,...,n
includes only those records which are censored.
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dK (l-pQ)t-exp(-Xt-)
_ ^ _ / . o.^
TT'^zl -,
, ; ,,, \ - Ti - X Tj (eqn A.25)
^K ^ eXp(-Xt:) S;-l ^ S:
— = y — ^- E ^— (eqn A.26)
^Po i l-exp(->.tp(l-pQ) 1-Pq j 1-Pq
c. Maximum Likelihood Variance
The equation for the variance of the probability distribution for p^' is
identical to equation D.20 when X equals zero. The equation for the K- for "k' is given
below.
Ki2(X') = [{{l-p^)t^]/PQ.Ti}2xp^(l.p^)Si-l + Ti2(l-p^)Si
7
where, K-" is evaluated at 'k = \' = 0. These variances were used to compute the




* COMPUTES MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD VALUE FOR A SINGLE UNKNOWN
* PARAMETER USING GOLDEN RATIO LINE SEARCH.
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/FTNF , FTF , PARAM , PSD
COMMON/ INT/CENSOR , NF , COUNT
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF{200) , FTNF(200) ,FTF(200) ,PARAM(2)







* COMPUTATION OF SEARCH INTERVAL TAU. TAU IS APPROXIMATELY
*




5 READ (3,50,END=99) CENSOR ( COUNT ) ,NF( COUNT ), FTNF( COUNT ), FTF (COUNT)
C0UNT=C0UNT+1
GO TO 5' " . •
99 C0UNT=C0UNT-1
* BOUNDING PHASE - SWANN'S METHOD
CALL ML(LB,FI)
6 ALPHA=ALPHA+(2'^*K)*STEP
CALL ML (ALPHA, F2)
* IF NEW VALUE IS LESS THAN PREVIOUS VALUE TERMINATE BOUNDING










* COMPARES THE FUNCTIONAL VALUES OF THE INTERNAL PTS . Bl & B2 , AND
* SELECTS THE VALUE WITH THE LARGEST FUNCTIONAL VALUE AS THE UPDATED
* PARAMETER ESTIMATE










































'OWUC: 7'OCONVERGENCE CRITERION ESTABLISHED')
'OSTANDARD DEVIATION IS : ',F9.8)
'OMLE FOR UNKNOWN PARAMETER IS: ',F9.8)
'0.95' ASSYMPTOTIC CONFIDENCE LIMITS ARE :
'





SUBROUTINE TERM(F1 , F2 ,TFLAG)
DETERMINES IF TERMINATION CONDITION HAS BEEN SATISFIED
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)




DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) , FTNF(200) , FTF(200) ,PARAM(2)
INTEGER TFLAG
TEST=ABS(F1-F2)




COMPUTES LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONAL VALUE
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/FTNF , FTF , PARAM , PSD
COMMON/ INT/ CENSOR , NF , COUNT
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) , FTNF(200) ,FTF(200) ,PARAM(2)



















SUBROUTINE SD ' "
* COMPUTES ASSYMPTOTIC STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
* ESTIMATE
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ FTNF , FTF , PARAM , PSD








* INPUT FLIGHT DATA
DO 5 1=1, COUNT
* UNCENSORED RECORDS
IF (CENSOR(I).EQ.O) THEN
K1=EXP ( -PARAM ( 1 ) *FTF ( I )
)
K2=EXP ( -PARAH ( 1 ) *FTNF ( I)
)
K3=((FTF(I)^K1/(1-K1))-FTNF(I))*((FTF(I)'^K1/(1-K1))-FTNF(I))












* COMPUTES ASSYMPTOTIC STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
* ESTIMATE FOR THE SORTIE DEPENDENT MODELS
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/ RL/ FTNF , FTF , PARAM , PSD
COMMON/ INT/ CENSOR , NF , COUNT
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,FTNF(200) ,FTF(200) ,PARAM(2)
INTEGER CENSOR, COUNT
REALMS L,LL1,LL2






* INPUT FLIGHT DATA








SUMKI 2=SUMKI 2+C6*C6=*^P*C3+FTNF ( I ) *FTNF ( I ) ^C2
5 CONTINUE
* COMPUTE STANDARD DEVIATIONS
PSD1=SQRT(1/SUMKI1)
PSD2=SQRT(1/SUMKI2)





































Figure F.l [ixponential Quantile-Quamile Plot: WUC 46X1600.
76
o> in o in o tn o
o o o> rs. o (N
S31liNVnO


































ur>\ : 1 : ! !
^
!
*S^ i 1 : 1 ! X
i : \ i ! ! : ! |
i
; l^ii i , i , _ j 1 oo
r—
i ! 1- !\ ^ i i : I
Ml j \ J__ i [ I
Mi MS\^ i i :
t/>
MM 1 i 1 i UJ(r
J j .1 : ] ;.>^s^ J • _.„.X ?i
J. ^..^ 1 , i "^V- - —••- Lk.
i M ; ' ]
_*\
_ _ j J* zuJ
: i i W\- i » $
: : : 1 ^ **»\ i CD•::•• '
' * \ * u
*"! 1 f r- ; t •V ; i(
i M










_».^..,..i_i.- ...J i « i— _ 4- * -\ 6
a> en U10 m o iTJ o •-
• o> a»o> r* m (N —
o» S31liNVnO
Figure F.5 li.xponential Quantile-Quantile Plot: WUC T^ASMOO.
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Figure F.9 WeibuU Quantile-Quantile Plot: WLC 4622100.
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Figure F.ll WeibuU Quantile-Quantile Plot: WUC 74A1500.
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The Quasi-Newton method was used to determine the maximum likelihood
estimates for the WeibuU and Mixed models. This method was derived from the
Newton's method through the Taylor's expansion of the objective function, ({x), where
X is the n x 1 column vector containing values for the n parameters being estimated.
The Newton method uses the quadratic approximation to fl^x), equation G.l. evaluated
at x'^ to iteratively determine an optimal solution.
n;x)~fi:x(^Vvfl:x(^^)'^Ax + .5Ax'^V^fi;x(^W (eqnG.l)
The_ next point in the sequence is found by forcing the -gradient of the quadratic




Allowing Ax to equal x^ ^-x^ ^ equation G.2 can be solved for x^ \
^{k+l)=^(k).y2f^^(k))-lyf(^(k)) (eqnG.3)
The two-parameter optimizer displayed in Appendix G did not use the Newton
method discussed above because the technique can be unreliable for nonquadratic
functions. Instead, a more robust Quasi-Newton method was used. The major
difference between the two methods is that the Quasi-Newton does not require use of
7 1
the inverse Hessian matrix V f^x) . Instead, it uses an n x n "A" matrix to estimate
the inverse Hessian matrix. The A^^ matrix was iteratively updated using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Shanno method, and should be a fair approximation to V-f^x")
,
when x'' is
the optimal solution. Substituting A^'^^ for Vfi^x' iri equation G.3 results in the
Quasi-Newton method for the determination of the next point in the sequence. This




* COMPUTES MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR TWO PARAMETER
* MODELS USING QUASI-NEWTON METHOD.
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,DIR(2) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF (200) ,GRAD(4) , PARAM(4)
DIMENSION A(4),A1(4),A2(4),DELP(2),DELG(2)
INTEGER CENSOR , CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG







WRITE (6,*) ' COUNT ', COUNT
* OUTPUT STARTING VALUES ;
WRITE (6,490)
WRITE (6,500) (PARAM(I),I=1,2)
* COMPUTE LOGLIKELIHOOD VALUE FOR INITIAL STARTING ESTIMATES
CALL LLIKE(l)
WRITE(6,510) FV .
* CHECK FOR CONVERGENCE
CALL CONCHK(l)
IF (CONFLG. EQ.l) GO TO 1000
1 ITER=ITER+1
WRITE (6,520) ITER
* IF ITERATIONS EQUAL FIFTY, PROGRAM IS TERMINATED EARLY




* IF IRES=1, OBJECTIVE FUNCTION IS NO LONGER IMPROVING AND GRADIENT
* IS NOT EQUAL TO ZERO. THE "A" MATRIX IS RESET TO THE IDENTITY MATRIX.







* COMPUTE DIRECTION OF IMPROVEMENT
DIR(1) = -1'^(A(1)'^GRAD(1)+A(2)*GRAD(2))
DIR(2)=-1*(A(3)*GRAD(1)+A(4)*GRAD(2))
* COMPUTE LINE STEP SIZE (ALPHA)
CALL LINE
* COMPUTE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARAM(K+1) AND PARAM(K) , AND
* DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GRAD(K+1) AND GRAD(K)
DO 10 1=1,2
DELP ( I ) =PARAM ( 1+2 ) -PARAM ( I
)




* UPDATE 'A' MATRIX
C1=DELP ( 1 ) *DELG ( 1 ) +DELP ( 2 ) *DELG ( 2 )
Al ( 1 ) =DELP ( 1 ) *DELP ( 1 ) / CI
Al ( 2 ) =DELP ( 1 ) *DELP ( 2 ) /CI













* UPDATE OLD PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND GRADIENTS TO NEW PARAMETER
^ ESTIMATES AND GRADIENTS
25
DO 25 1=1.2




* OUTPUT UPDATED PARAMETERS
WRITE (6,500) (PARAM(I),I=1,2)
* OUTPUT FUNCTIONAL VALUE
FV=-1*FVAL
WRITE(6,510) FV
* CHECK FOR CONVERGENCE
CALL CONCHK(l)
IF (CONFLG.EQ.l) GO TO 1000

















'OPHAT IS: ',F15.8,/', ' LHAT IS: ' F15.8)
'OLOGLIKELIHOOD VALUE IS: ',F13.6)
'OITERATION: ',13,/,' ')
'OPROGRAM COMPLETION')




'OUNSUCCESSFUL TERMINATION: ITERATIONS =50')
SUBROUTINE INPUT
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* READS FLIGHT AND MAINTENANCE RECORDS USED IN THE CALCULATION
* OF MIXED MODEL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR PHAT AND
* LAMBDA HAT
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200 ) ,DIR(2) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF(200) ,GRAD(4) ,PARAM(4)
INTEGER CENSOR , CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG




* INPUT FLIGHT DATA










* DETERMINES IF OPTIMAL SOLUTION HAS BEEN FOUND
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,DIR( 2 ) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF(200) ,GRAD(4) ,PARAM(4)
INTEGER CENSOR, CONFLG, COUNT, TFLAG
REALMS NORMG
* TERMINATE IF THE NORM OF THE GRADIENT (NORMG) IS LESS THAN THE
* THE SPECIFIED CRITICAL VALUE (CRIT)
N0RMG=((GRAD(N)*GRAD(N))+(GRAD(N+1)*GRAD(N+1 )))**.
5










500 FORMAT ( '
C






* COMPUTES MAXIMUM STEP SIZE (ALPHA)
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) , DIR(2 ) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF(200) ,GRAD(4) ,PARAM(4)








* COMPUTATION OF SEARCH INTERVAL TAU. TAU IS APPROXIMATELY
*
.618 AND TAUl IS APPROXIMATELY .382
TAU=(5**.5-l)/2
TAU1=1-TAU



















=PARAM ( 1 ) +ALPHA*DIR (
1
PARAM ( 4 ) =PARAM ( 2.) +ALPHA^D IR (
2
* COMPUTE LOGLIKELIHOOD VALUE
CALL LLIKE(3)
F2=FVAL
* IF NEW VALUE IS LESS THAN PREVIOUS VALUE TERMINATE BOUNDING









































* CHECK FOR LINE SEARCH TERMINATION
100 CALL TERM(ALPHAK)
ALPHAK=ALPHA
IF (TFLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 5000
GO TO 50
5000 PARAM(3)=PARAM(1)+ALPHA*DIR(1)





* DETERMINES IF CONVERGENCE CRITERIA IS ESTABLISHED FOR LINE
* SEARCH TERMINATION
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,DIR(2) ,FTNF(200)
DIMENS ION FTF ( 200 ) , GRAD ( 4 ) , PARAM ( 4
)
INTEGER CENSOR , CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG
TFLAG=0
CTEST=ABS ( (ALPHAK-ALPHA) /ALPHA)




* COMPUTES LOGLIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONAL VALUE AND GRADIENTS FOR
* FOR THE WEIBULL MODEL
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
95
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,DIR(2) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF(200) ,GRAD(4) ,PARAM(4)
INTEGER CENSOR, CONFLG, COUNT, TFLAG
* ESTABLISH BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
* PARAM (N)=SHAPE PARAMETER; PARAM (N+1)=SCALE PARAMTER
IF (PARAM(N) .LT. .0000000001) PARAM(N)= . 0001





* INPUT FLIGHT DATA
DO 5 1=1, COUNT
C1=PARAM(N+1)*FTNF(I)
C2=C1**PARAM(N)
IF (Cl.EQ.O.) Cl=. 00001
* UNCENSORED RECORDS
IF (CENSOR(I) .EQ.O) THEN





* FUNCTIONAL VALUE CALCULATIONS
FVAL=FVAL-LOG(C5-C6) '
* GRADIENT CALCULATIONS
GRAD (N ) =GRAD (N ) + ( ( C5*C2*LOG( CI ) ) - ( C6*C4*L0G ( C3 ) ) ) / ( C5 -C6
)






* FUNCTIONAL VALUE CALCULATIONS
FVAL=FVAL+C2
* GRADIENT CALCULATIONS








* COMPUTES THE STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
* ESTIMATORS FOR THE WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION, WHICH, IS USED
* TO CONSTRUCT .95 CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR THE SHAPE AND
* SCALE PARAMETERS.
IMPLICIT REALMS (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) ,DIR(2) ,FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF (200) , GRAD (4) , PARAM (4)







DO 5 1=1, COUNT






SUMKI1=SUMKI 1+C* ( ( ( ( FTNF ( I ) **PARAM { 1 ) - CI **PARAM ( 1 ) ) '^C4 ) '*' ( ( FTNF ( I ) *



















('OPSDl: ',F6.5,' CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (
'





('0PSD2: ',F6.5,' CONFIDENCE INTERVAL ( ' , F6 . 5 , ' , ' , F6 . 5 , ' ) ' )
SUBROUTINE LLIKE(N)
/^ COMPUTES LOGLIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONAL VALUE AND GRADIENTS FOR
* THE MIXED MODEL.
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,0-Z)
COMMON/RL/ALPHA , FVAL , UFVAL , DIR , FTNF , FTF , GRAD , PARAM
COMMON/ INT/ CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG , CENSOR , NF
DIMENSION CENSOR(200) ,NF(200) , DIR(2) , FTNF(200)
DIMENSION FTF(200) ,GRAD(4) , PARAM(4)
INTEGER CENSOR , CONFLG , COUNT , TFLAG
* ESTABLISH BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
IF (PARAM(N).LT. .0000000001) PARAM(N)= .0001
IF (PARAM(N) .GE.l.) PARAM(N)= . 9999







* INPUT FLIGHT DATA
DO 5 1=1, COUNT
* UNCENSORED RECORDS
IF ( CENSOR ( I ).EQ.O) THEN
C3=EXP(-PARA>I(N+1)^FTF(I))
* FUNCTIONAL VALUE CALCULATIONS
FVAL=FVAL-LOG( 1-C3^C1 )
-









* FUNCTIONAL VALUE CALCULATIONS











WEIBULL SIMULATION OF COMPONENT FAILURES
* VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
* ALPHA :WEIBULL SHAPE PARAMETER
* AC:MATRIX USED TO STORE EACH AIRCRAFTS PREVIOUS FLIGHT HOURS
* WITHOUT FAILURE AND UNCONDITIONAL SURVIVAL FUNCTION
* AS:AIRCRAFT SELECTED FOR FLIGHT EVOLUTION
* CPF: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
* DTIME: DEPLOYMENT TIME
* FAILrMATRIX USED TO STORE SIMULATED FAILURES AT SPECIFIED TIME
* INTERVALS FOR EACH DEPLOYMENT SIMULATION
* FT: FLIGHT TIME
* GFC: GENERATED FAILURE CRITERIA
* HM:HISTORICAL MEAN
* HSD:HISTORICAL STANDARD DEVIATION
* LHATrMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE FOR WEIBULL SCALE PARAMETER
* NAC:NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT USED IN SIMULATION
* NI:NUMBER OF TIME INTERVALS TO BE USED IN SIMULATION (500 HR INT.)
* NS:NUMBER OF SIMULATIONS TO BE RUN
* NSEED1:SEED USED TO DETERMINE AIRCRAFT CHOSEN FOR FLIGHT
* NSEED2:SEED USED TO DETERMINE FLIGHT DURATION
* NSEED3:SEED USED TO HDETERMINE IF A COMPONENT FAILURE WAS OBSERVED
* TGATE:TIME GATE
* TIMEiACCUMULATED FLIGHT TIME
* UCPS: UNCONDITIONAL PROFAILITY OF FAILURE
DIMENSION AC(70,2) ,FAIL(20,100) ,EST(20,4)
INTEGER AS
REAL * 4 LHAT
* INITIALIZE • .












* SIMULATE AND RECORD COMPONENT FAILURES USING 500 HR INTERVALS
DO 10 J=1,NI
* LRND AND LNORM ARE SUBROUTINES IN A RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR PACKAGE
* CALLED LLRANDOMII: A NON-IMSL PROGRAM AVAILABLE AT THE NAVAL
* POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL.
* GENERATE UNIFORM (0,1) RANDOM VARIABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH AIRCRAFT
* WILL BE FLOWN
11 CALL LRND (NSEED1,U, 1,2,0)
AS=(U*(NAC-1))+1.5






* COMPUTE THE UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR S+FT HRS
,
* WHERE S EQUALS THE TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS FLOWN SINCE THE LAST
























* NEXT AIRCRAFT SORTIE TO BE SIMULATED
GO TO 11




* CALCULATE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE NUMBER OF FAILURES
^ OBSERVED AT EACH TIME INTERVAL (MEAN=EST( J , 1 ) ;STANDARD
^ DEVIATI0N=EST(J,2))
DO 20 J=1,NI
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Figure 1.2 Geometric Model: Model Set \VUC:734II100.
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Figure 1.5 Flight Hour Models: Model Set WUC:40X1600.
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Figure 1.7 Flight Hour Models: Validation Set \VLC:-40X16OO.
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Figure 1. 10 Geometric Model: Model Set WLC:462210U.
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Figure 1.14 Geometric Model: Model Set WUC:56X2500.
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Figure 1.18 Geometric Model: Model Set WUC:632Zi<H).
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Figure 1.19 Flight Hour Models: Validation Set \VL"C:632Z100.
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Fi'jurc 1.22 Geometric Model: Model Set \VUC:74A1500.
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Figure 1.25 Geometric Model: Model Set \VL"C:74A5M00.
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Figure 1.29 Geometric Model: Model Set WUC:5772200.
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Figure 1.32 Flight Hour Models: Model Set WL'C:69 18100.
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Figure 1.34 Flight Hour Models: Validation Set WUC:6918100.
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Figure 1.35 Geometric Model: Validation Set \VUC:691S100.
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